Tag Archives: Iraq

Review of the Book, The Power Struggle in Iraq — The North Star Reports – by Antonio Hall. Sponsored by The College of St. Scholastica and The Middle Ground Journal

Review of the Book, The Power Struggle in Iraq — The North Star Reports – by Antonio Hall. Sponsored by The College of St. Scholastica and The Middle Ground Journal

U22-9928_770x200

The Power Struggle in Iraq. Benjamin Shwadran. New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1960.

Abstract: The Power Struggle in Iraq serves as a roadmap to those in the West who were aware of the new government which took power in Iraq following the Coup of 1958, but were unsure how it would affect the West, especially in terms of economics and politics. Author Bejamin Shwadran begins with a retelling of conditions that led to the coup which transpired in 1958. Iraq’s monarchy allowed Western imperialists to hoard Iraqi oil and the farming industry while leaving the Iraqi people in a disenfranchised condition. Arab countries, Iraq, Egypt, and the United Arab Republic (or former Syria) in particular, were pitted against each other, thwarting the aim of Arab nationalism. Shwadran details formal and informal alliances between Arab nations and their supporters among major powers around the world, and the ways they led to conflict.

The Power Struggle in Iraq by Benjamin Shwadran highlights the key moments, contributors, and ramifications of the Qasim regime. The book was intended to illuminate the status of Iraqi politics, economy, and its national and international identity post-revolution in relation to Western societies. Shwadran, a retired professor of Middle-Eastern affairs, is Jewish and was born in Old Jerusalem in 1907. In 1960, The Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press in New York published this book as means to educate the recently removed imperialists of the West about the status of Iraq at that time. Shwadran emphasizes early and often throughout the book that Westerners must take into account that Iraqis live in a culture and society very unfamiliar to them. As the book was written in 1960, it focuses on only the first 21 months after the regime of General Abd al-Karim Qasim took control of Iraq during the coup in July of 1958 and formed a republic.

Gen. Qasim was in favor of a united Arabic movement but was indifferent to the goal of establishing a solidified and independent Iraq. President Nasser of Egypt, on the other hand, wanted to unite, and even control, the entire Middle East. Nasser utilized his political and economic ties with the communist Soviet Union and the countries of Western capitalists to remain atop the Middle East hierarchy. Nasser wanted Qasim and the newly liberated Iraq to be encompassed in the Arab nationalist movement. By doing this, Nasser hoped to gain influence over Iraq’s oil and agricultural industries. The Soviet communists and Western capitalists both initially backed Nasser in his push to unify Arabic nations because they were uncertain of the new Iraq leadership and how it would recognize the provisions of the 1955 Baghdad Pact. Qasim knew this, so he remained impartial toward Iraqi allies such as the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as Nasser and the Arabic unification movement. In this eight-chapter book, Shwadran addresses the issues that Gen. Qasim and his followers faced during the first 21 months of power. These included the franchising of the Iraqi people, incorporating a new ideology of political and economic reform, ridding the country of anarchists who did not share his ideals, and remaining devoted to Iraq while supporting the trans-Arabic movement for all of the Middle East.

Shwadran emphasizes how the medium of radio in Iraq and Egypt played an important part in the propaganda both for and against Arab nationalism. Most of the primary sources used in the book are speeches made by Gen. Qasim of Iraq and the President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Whether the leaders were calling for Arab nationalism, combating each other’s ideals on independence, or arguing the question of alignment with communist or capitalists, it was communicated primarily by radio. The Mahdawi court system was another key component of the Qasim’s regime that utilized television and radio broadcasts to spread ideology and propaganda to the people under the new Iraqi government. These public hearings became a dramatized condemnation of members and supporters of the old Iraqi government and those who were believed to be against Gen. Qasim and his regime.

More broadly, it was imperative that Iraq remained, or appeared to remain, neutral in the eyes of the Soviet communists and the Western capitalists. Although Iraq was doing away with the imperialists and feudalists that marred their country for generations, it still needed these entities for its own economic and political prosperity. Shwadran concludes by explaining the ramifications of failing to maintain this image and gives an excellent explanation of the delicate social interests the Iraqi government was balancing and which it was imperative to consider before condemning and convicting them according to Western ideologies, especially since the two societies were so estranged.

Chapter One explains the book’s purpose. Shwadran did not intend for this book to be a history of the coup but instead an outline of the dynamics at play in Iraq that shaped the revolution, and the process and order in which these dynamics were addressed. British imperialistic ideologies, unification of Iraqi people, and building a solidified central government were the ongoing battles being fought daily in Iraq during the time of the book’s writing. The parties involved, how these fights were fought, as well as the obstacles impeding Iraqi progress as a republic are all addressed.

The second chapter is dedicated to those figures whom Shwadran deemed the four major personalities of the Qasim regime and briefly synopsizes why they were important. They include Gen. Qasim, Colonel al-Mahadawi, Staff Major General al-Abdi, and Dr. Ibrahim Kubbah. Regarding Qasim, Shwadran gives a brief summary of his extensive military career and education with emphasis on his unquenchable fixation to rid Iraq of the British imperialists and his undeniable leadership abilities. Qasim had little interest in anything other than his military career and the liberation of his country; Shwadran notes that despite being an exceptional athlete he turned down many athletic clubs’ invitations to join their teams. Qasim also would refrain from drinking and going off with women like the other military officers did frequently. Qasim spent all of his time while in service contemplating the condition of his country and its people. His determination and demeanor naturally catapulted him to the position of leader in the 1958 coup.

Col. al-Mahdawi was Qasim’s cousin and appointed by Qasim to be president of the Special Supreme Military Court. The court was intended for the public display of trials and hearings for those who were in favor of the old Iraq government or who opposed Qasim and his following. The court, over time, became a source of entertainment due to its over-the-top and non-traditional practices that are discussed in further detail in the fifth chapter. Shwadran implies that al-Mahdawi used his position to gain favor and popularity among the Iraqi people.

Staff Maj. Gen. al-Abdi was a powerful man because he controlled the army as the Chief of Staff and Governor General. Whoever was in power had as much autonomy as the army would grant them. Many believed that al-Abdi would be next in line to run the country should something happen to Qasim. Like Qasim, al-Abdi was a devout Iraq nationalist. He opposed the communists of his country and was against Nasser’s United Arab Republic.

Dr. Ibrahim Kubbah was probably one of the brightest and most forward-thinking people in the Iraqi government. He was a leading economist, serving as the Minister of Economy, Minister of Agrarian Reform, and Minister of Oil Affairs at different points during his career. Much of his personal ideology stemmed from communist influence which would author the end of his career. He was stripped of his political office in 1960 after the Communist Political Party was denied its license to operate in Iraq in hopes of deterring communist uprisings against the government. Kubbah was the face of the Communist Political Party in Iraq, therefore he could no longer work in the government. Political allegiance was a primary concern both domestically and abroad in Iraq at the time.

Chapter Three briefly goes into detail about the incidents just prior to the July 14 coup and residual effects that lingered for the next twenty-one months. Imperialism and corruption were driving forces behind the revolution, but there were other issues that had to be addressed by the Iraqi government. How to make the government a popular republic? How to foster Iraqi unity “from the ground up” in society? How to deal with people and groups who oppose the Qasim regime? How to remain independent yet aligned with the West and Communists? How to fend off an overbearing Nasser and United Arab Republic and still be dedicated to Arabian unity? All of these questions were concerns addressed in this chapter. The events made reference to include The Arif—al-Gailani Affair, The Mosul Revolt, The Kirkuk Incident, and the attempt on Qasim’s life. Political allegiance held higher import than nationalism at the time of the coup. These incidents reinforced that fact of Iraqi politics and the uphill battle that the Qasim Regime had to mount for a united Iraq.

The next chapter is dedicated to confrontations such as the face-off between Nasser and Qasim, the United Arabic Republic versus Iraq, and communist versus capitalist allegiance. When Iraq overthrew its monarchy, it also severed its allegiance to Great Britain and its imperial stronghold. It was not alone. Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt all found themselves in the midst of trying to do away with Western influences on their countries while establishing independence, as well as establishing unity among Arab nations. Nasser, was president of Egypt and head of the United Arab Republic. The Republic was supposed to promote unification among all Arab countries, however, Nasser and his backers from abroad had other agendas.

Since Egypt had the Suez Canal, the Western Imperialists and the Soviet Communists wanted to aid the Republic. They, along with Nasser, became enthralled with inducting Iraq into the Republic after its revolution because this would ensure that all involved could benefit from Iraq’s oil and agricultural resources. Qasim, being the enlightened leader that he was, understood this. While Qasim promoted Arab unification, his main focus was the unification and solidarity of the Iraqi people. Qasim would not commit to the Republic because that would have diluted his power with Nasser perceived as the ranking leader due to his role overseeing the Republic. Initially Qasim pacified Nasser by entertaining the idea of joining the Republic. As time went on and it became evident that Qasim would not join, altercations ensued between Nasser and Qasim. Radio and television broadcasts added fuel to the fire. Many propaganda messages were delivered in order to “dethrone” one another in the eyes of all Arabs. Whenever a situation occurred such as the Arif Affair, Mossul Revolt, or an attempted assassination, one side was emphatically blamed by the other.

The Court of Al-Mahdawi is the focus of Chapter Five. As mentioned before, Mahdawi was Qasim’s cousin and appointed as president to the Special Supreme Military Court. The court was implemented to hold hearings for those who supported the old monarchy or opposed the Qasim regime, but evolved into the central source of amusement for the Iraqi people. Proceedings were broadcast on radio, allowing Mahdawi to turn the court into a propagandizing machine, especially against Nasser and the United Arab Republic. Madhawi was the judge of the court but soon became the prosecutor as well. He had no regard for court procedure and would often badger and insult those on trial, and glorify the leaders of the Iraqi government or even recite poetry during hearings. Mahdawi did this to increase the popularity of the ruling regime and himself amongst the Iraqi people. The court became a spectacle; many reveled in its elements of the Salem Witch Trials and contemporary American presidential campaigns combined to form an elaborate circus for the Iraqi people.

Chapter Six, entitled Economic Development, focuses on Iraq’s economy as of 1959 and how it was intended to grow and change under Qasim’s rule. Dr. Kubbah, who was highlighted in the second chapter, was the leading economist in Iraq until Qasim was forced to dissolve the communist party after an attempt on his life was perceived to be orchestrated by a communist political group. Prior to his exit, Kubbah initiated and analyzed many economic policies for Iraq. In his opinion the reform that most needed to be addressed was the Agrarian Reform Law, which was supposed to adjust the balance of power between landlords and peasants, ultimately franchising the peasants of Iraq. The law was unsuccessful due to political instability and reluctance from peasants to follow government-issued sanctions, causing a food shortage in 1959.

Iraq’s oil industry was affected by the Qasim revolt as well. The Qasim regime felt that Britain and the old regime had a development plan for long range projects. All existing Western contracts were cancelled by the regime. This, along with the new leadership’s many notions for reform, caused a drop in oil revenue and the economy became unstable, adversely affecting the government. Implementation for any grand reform takes time and practice to work out the kinks. It also takes the willingness of those who are part of the system to adhere to the policy. Iraq in 1959 had neither the patience nor compliance required, so the economy suffered a blow.

The seventh chapter, The Great Power Policies, focuses on how the U.S.S.R., United States, and Great Britain reacted to the 1958 revolt and also how they intended to deal with the U.A.R. and Iraq. At the time of the revolt the U.S.S.R. was backing the U.A.R. because of the advantage it provided them over its Western nemeses in access to Middle Eastern oil supplies. Once Iraq revolted and refrained from entering the U.A.R., the Soviets favored Iraq because of its oil supply and Qasim’s initial assent to the local communist party’s role in government. Nasser often played both sides against the middle —communists versus capitalists— to maintain power in the Middle East. For these reasons and others, the Soviets wanted to aid Iraq. Western capitalists were worried that they would be shut out of the oil market in the Middle East as a result of the coup. The West, the United States particularly, became frantic following the revolution. They felt it was a communist-supported coup that intended to cut America out of the oil flow and strengthen communist ties in the Middle East. Once the U.S. was assured that the Baghdad Pact would be honored and they would continue to get oil, they breathed a sigh of relief. For its part, after Great Britain was assured of its oil, it offered full economic and military aid to the Qasim regime.

In the conclusion Shwadran reemphasizes the copious amount of change and uncertainty in the Iraqi government and the U.A.R. at the time. He alludes to the misperceptions by other great powers such as the U.S. and Great Britain about the Middle East powers aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. Iraq wanted independence, and the U.A.R. and Iraq both welcomed Arab nationalism. However, their approaches were very different. Qasim believed that change comes from the bottom up, from the common people. He felt that the common people needed to buy into the idea of a pan-Arab republic and then change would come from within. Nasser believed that nationalism stems from the top down; the bourgeois and elite must be on board and then the concept will trickle further down. One thing that was for certain, especially pertaining to Iraq, was that whoever controls the military controls the country. Shwadran asserts that the army is the lifeblood of Iraq— without the support of the military, the figure in charge is powerless.

As a novice to Middle Eastern history I found this book both engaging and enlightening. Shwadran deftly transitions from chapter to chapter, often making reference or alluding to something that will revisited or expounded upon later while still making a linear argument with great clarity. Although The Power Struggle in Iraq is a rather short book, it is extremely informative and efficient. The primary sources were utilized well, most being interviews, speeches, and broadcasts by Arab leaders and officials. It covers a broad spectrum of domestic and foreign issues surrounding the 1958 coup that had immediate and long-term ramifications for Iraq. The book paints a vivid picture for readers in the Western world of the social, political, and economical intricacies pertaining to the Iraq government immediately following the Coup.

Antonio Hall, student, Texas State University.

Please contact Professor Liang if you wish to write for The North Star Reports — HLIANG (at) css.edu

See also, our Facebook page with curated news articles at http://www.facebook.com/NorthStarReports

The North Star Reports: Global Citizenship and Digital Literacy, The College of St. Scholastica and the scholarly Middle Ground Journal’s online learning community and outreach program with undergraduate and K-12 classes around the world. The North Star Reports has flourished since 2012. For a brief summary, please see the American Historical Association’s Perspectives on History, at:

http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/2013/1305/Opening-The-Middle-Ground-Journal.cfm

The North Star Reports publishes edited essays from our students, particularly from those who are currently stationed, or will soon be stationed abroad. Students have reported from Mongolia, Southern China, Shanghai, Norway, northeastern China, Micronesia, The Netherlands, Tanzania, Ireland, England, Finland, Russia, and Haiti. We also have students developing reviews of books, documentaries, and films, and analysis of current events from around the world. We will post their dispatches, and report on their interactions with the North Star Reports students and teachers. We thank The Department of History and Politics and the School of Arts and Letters of The College of St. Scholastica for their generous financial support for The North Star Reports and The Middle Ground Journal.

Hong-Ming Liang, Ph.D., Editor-in-Chief, The North Star Reports; Chief Editor, The Middle Ground Journal; Associate Professor of History and Politics, The College of St. Scholastica, Duluth, MN, USA

(c) 2012-present The North Star Reports: Global Citizenship and Digital Literacy http://NorthStarReports.org ISSN: 2377-908X The NSR is sponsored by The College of St. Scholastica and the scholarly Middle Ground Journal. See Masthead for our not-for-profit educational open- access policy. K-12 teachers, if you are using these reports for your classes, please contact editor-in-chief Professor Liang at HLIANG (at) css.edu

11150890_447281555439307_3652092331655400221_n

1 Comment

Filed under North Star Student Editors, Professor Hong-Ming Liang

Review of the Book, Iraq Reborn: A firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After — The North Star Reports – by Tanya Tellez. Sponsored by The College of St. Scholastica and The Middle Ground Journal

Review of the Book, Iraq Reborn: A firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After — The North Star Reports – by Tanya Tellez. Sponsored by The College of St. Scholastica and The Middle Ground Journal

U22-9928_640x360

Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After. Ismail Al-Arif. New York: Vantage Press, 1982. ISBN: 9780533050093

In Iraq Reborn: A firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After, former Ambassador for Iraq to Czechoslovakia Ismail Al-Arif gives the Western reader a viewpoint on the turmoil that occurred in the Middle East that is not often recognized. Ismail Al-Arif was one of the 1958 coup’s leading revolutionaries and solicited future Iraq leader General Qasim’s support for the cause. This book concentrates on the origins of the 1958 revolution, the Free Officers Movement, the organization of the army, and the impact the revolution had on Iraq’s domestic and foreign policies.

Ismail Al-Arif’s main point and focus is not only to give the reader insight into what occurred prior to the coup and during and after the revolution. It is also his lament for the people in Iraq, his people seeking security and comfort within Iraq and at the same time constantly finding themselves involved in worldwide politics. Al-Arif opens with an explanation of why he wrote this book and gives the Western reader his point of view of what matters were misinterpreted by the Western press. Ismail Al-Arif wrote this book to give the general public what it had never had before, a firsthand historical account to enable them to understand what was really going on in Iraq’s political and social developments. He is successful in giving the reader insight on the circumstances that made it so the coup was decisive on reorienting and shaping Iraq’s entire governmental policy.

The introduction begins with some history of the country as well as a physical description of Iraq. Ismail gives the reader a brief historical timeline from the succession of Sumerian dynasties, Hammurabi, the invasion of the Kassites, the Assyrians, the Ummayad Dynasty, the Mongols and Genghis Khan. Al-Arif’s brief overview of Iraq’s history shows the reader that Iraq has been in constant struggle. Al-Arif ends his summary with the British conquering Iraq in 1918 and thus begins with the topic in Chapter One about foreign relations prior to 1958.

Al-Arif writes about the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and how it was to remain in force for twenty-five years. Under its terms Iraq became a British mandate, and eventually new treaties were added in 1926 and 1927. The Iraqi people did not accept the treaties because they felt that the League of Nations mandate was just another form of British occupation of Iraq. The people of Iraq already felt oppressed and these formal agreements that were established with England were viewed as setbacks to the economic and social development of the country. Undeclared war began between the Iraqi Army and British troops that lasted about thirty days. Eventually, when the British and the Trans-Jordanian Army surrounded Baghdad, the revolutionary officers left with Prime Minister Gaylani for Iran. This was the first time in modern history in which Iraq had a taste of total independence from any foreign domination. This independence, however, did not last long. After only four weeks pro-British politicians returned to power. Al-Arif closes the chapter with the Baghdad Pact and explains to the reader that this pact was met with serious opposition in the army, especially among members of the Free Officers Movement Organization.

In the second chapter, Al-Arif names four social forces that were causing the turmoil and political instability in Iraq after World War I. These four social forces– ethnic and religious forces, feudalism and tribalism, the middle class, and the workers and the peasants– would create a fundamental social shift that would wipe out past issues and build a modern, civilized society. This societal change was behind the desire for a true nationalist revolution that would result in Iraq’s independence.

Chapters Three and Four talk about Progressive and Revolutionary movements that began and why it was that the people of Iraq felt the need for revolution. The Communist Party began to appeal to students, intellectuals, and teachers. With this, socialism began to impact the minds of new generations in the late 1930s. The army and its Free Officers Movement were the only social force at the time capable of running a revolution. Al-Arif gives accounts of the meetings the officers had, where they met, who the men in the army were who were planning the revolution, and how it was the officers came to agreement on who would be part of the coup. Another great aspect of this book is that Al-Arif uses accounts of which recruitment efforts took place, what was discussed, and what was written in the letters between the author himself and General Qasim. A list of names of other officers who were persuaded to join the movement is included.

Chapter Five is the most interesting and includes amazing firsthand accounts of what occurred on the day of the revolution, July 14, 1958. Names of men who took action, from where, and what places where eventually occupied are recalled. Al-Arif gives the reader insight into what occurred when they went after the royal family and what happened to Nuri Said when he was on the point of escaping. Proclamation No.1 declaring a People’s Republic in Iraq was announced on July 14, 1958 and the Council of Sovereignty was established.

Al-Arif concludes his firsthand account with the domestic policies and the problems that the new government faced after the revolution of July 14, 1958. At the time it was written, a series of violations and activities in the border areas was becoming a persistent issue. A war was in effect, and Al-Arif closes his text with, “The war is still in progress at the time of this writing.”

Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After is a great book to read for perspective on before, during and after the revolution. Ismail Al-Arif provides the reader with full text appendixes of the Proclamation No.1 of the Revolution of July 14, 1958, the Provisional Constitution of the First Republic of Iraq-1958, the March 11 Manifesto on the Peaceful Settlement of the Kurdish Issue in Iraq, and last but not least, the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Sometimes the author will end in phrases that give a strong opinion about an event or situation, but this should not take away from what a fine work this is that may serve to help historians, or any reader, to understand the reasons behind the revolution of July 14, 1958. The most valuable aspect of Al-Arif’s book is the fact that the author was one of the leading figures in the 1958 coup and his insights into the revolution lead to valuable conversations on how this event can be viewed. It helped me, the researcher and student,understand why it was that the Free Officers took matters into their own hands and why the people of Iraq supported their actions. It is a great read and it is clearly a way to impart to the Western reader a point of view of Middle East turmoil that is rarely recognized. This would make a great resource for any upper level graduate studying and researching the revolution as well as aspects related to the decision and formation of the successful event.

Tanya Tellez. I am a United States Navy veteran. I am also a mother and a student at Texas State University, in San Marcos, Texas. I am a major in History and a minor in Health Education.

Please contact Professor Liang if you wish to write for The North Star Reports — HLIANG (at) css.edu

See also, our Facebook page with curated news articles at http://www.facebook.com/NorthStarReports

The North Star Reports: Global Citizenship and Digital Literacy, The College of St. Scholastica and the scholarly Middle Ground Journal’s online learning community and outreach program with undergraduate and K-12 classes around the world. The North Star Reports has flourished since 2012. For a brief summary, please see the American Historical Association’s Perspectives on History, at:

http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/2013/1305/Opening-The-Middle-Ground-Journal.cfm

The North Star Reports publishes edited essays from our students, particularly from those who are currently stationed, or will soon be stationed abroad. Students have reported from Mongolia, Southern China, Shanghai, northeastern China, The Netherlands, Tanzania, Ireland, England, Finland, Russia, and Haiti. We also have students developing reviews of books, documentaries, and films, and analysis of current events from around the world. We will post their dispatches, and report on their interactions with the North Star Reports students and teachers. We thank The Department of History and Politics and the School of Arts and Letters of The College of St. Scholastica for their generous financial support for The North Star Reports and The Middle Ground Journal.

Hong-Ming Liang, Ph.D., Editor-in-Chief, The North Star Reports; Chief Editor, The Middle Ground Journal; Associate Professor of History and Politics, The College of St. Scholastica, Duluth, MN, USA

(c) 2012-present The North Star Reports: Global Citizenship and Digital Literacy http://NorthStarReports.org ISSN: 2377-908X The NSR is sponsored by The Middle Ground Journal and The College of St. Scholastica. See Masthead for our not-for-profit educational open- access policy. K-12 teachers, if you are using these reports for your classes, please contact editor-in-chief Professor Liang at HLIANG (at) css.edu

11150890_447281555439307_3652092331655400221_n

Leave a comment

Filed under North Star Student Editors, Professor Hong-Ming Liang